


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SAFE **Passage**



**AUTUMN/
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-
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Ramblings *of the Editor*

So here we are again with another edition of Safe Passage, bringing together some new topics and revisiting others.

The easing of COVID restrictions is marked by the return of cruising, a welcome change considering the dramatic departure of cruise ships in early 2020. Cruise ships present a number of unique challenges for marine pilots and can either be the easiest ships we pilot because the bridge team know what they are doing, or the most difficult, because they think they know what they are doing. In this edition we have a feature article scrutinising passenger ship redundancy and highlighting a stark contrast with the robust systems in place that protect dynamic positioning vessels against single point failures. Education and understanding of the evolving technology in cruise ships will assist in our risk assessment, particularly in relation to tug requirements.

Prior to the COVID shutdown P&O Australia had been making significant progress in working with ports to develop joint passage plans to enhance the shared mental model, one of the processes that can help prevent the 'think they know what are doing' situation mentioned above. I hope that we will see this initiative resumed.

Our successful Wollongong conference is also highlighted with a post-conference report by lead organiser Captain Rob Tanner.

Captain Arie Palmer is providing us with another look at pilot ladders, this time the conundrum of non-compliant ladders on naval vessels.

As the dust starts to settle in Brisbane, we reprint an opinion piece from the NZMPA magazine scrutinising the past year's events. Reports are that many of the ex-BMP pilots have secured employment, however it should not be underestimated how this kind of disruption has adversely impacted the families of those pilots involved. Has this change resulted in the promised improved and reconceptualised pilotage?

As always, if you have photos, articles, news or letters, please email them to editor@ampi.org.au. Fresh content is always welcome.

Safe piloting,



Captain Ricky Rouse
Editor / Newcastle Pilot

*Courtesy of Captain
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President's Report

Welcome all to the Winter Edition of Safe Passage.

I am writing this President's report whilst winging my way back to work in Western Australia without the need to apply for an entry visa to return to work. It seems as though the mindset of dealing with Covid-19 has changed from elimination to living with the virus. For this we can thank the advent of Covid vaccines and the willingness of most people to become vaccinated. This change to living with the virus is I think a good thing and whilst some protocols are still in place it seems that dealing with Covid is a lot less stressful. The world is again opening up allowing us to regain a degree of normality in our lives. It is now up to us to learn to live with the virus and possibly accept that we are all going to catch the virus sooner or later.

The world is still not a safer place though as recent world events are showing and this has caused further ripples in the supply chain which we as pilots are dealing with as best we can.

The relaxation of the Covid rules has allowed AMPI to hold a very successful conference in Wollongong in late March. This well attended event discussed Australia's maritime future and the organisers, presenters, sponsors and attendees are all to be thanked for helping to make the event such a great success.

AMPI is at present making preparations to hold two events next year, one in Hobart and the other in Perth.

The end of last year was a tough one for AMPI as we were forced to watch the dissolution of a very successful pilotage operation in the Port of Brisbane. This change by MSQ in AMPI's view led to a lessening of training standards and was strongly resisted by not only AMPI but IMPA as well. Alas it was to no avail and MSQ instituted their emergency powers and allowed the training to be done by simulation which goes against all recommendations.

At the end of the day though, Poseidon are now doing the piloting (with the help I believe of a number of ex-Brisbane pilots who have joined the Poseidon team) and as hard as it may seem for some of us to accept we do need to think about extending the olive branch and invite Poseidon into the fold.



Captain Peter Dann
AMPI President

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Cruise Ship Redundancy

When entering port in a vessel with 7,000 passengers on board, how many escort tugs should you use? Given that the regulations already mandate machinery redundancy for passenger vessels, do these vessels even need escort tugs? These can be contentious questions; however, following several high-profile incidents involving blackouts, loss of propulsion, or loss of control on board large passenger ships, we must consider them.

When entering port in a vessel with 7,000 passengers on board, how many escort tugs should you use? Given that the regulations already mandate machinery redundancy for passenger vessels, do these vessels even need escort tugs? These can be contentious questions; however, following several high-profile incidents involving blackouts, loss of propulsion, or loss of control on board large passenger ships, we must consider them.

According to the classification society DNV,¹ the media reported just 4 full or partial cruise ship blackouts in transit or manoeuvring; in 2019, this increased to 12. But weren't the redundancy requirements in the SOLAS Safe Return to Port (SRtP) regulations meant to reduce blackouts? Unfortunately, it's not that simple.

Fortunately, another set of regulations outperforms SRtP when it comes to blackout prevention and recovery: dynamic positioning (DP). This article considers the differences between the DP and SRtP goals and redundancy requirements, and compares their effectiveness at preventing blackouts.

What is "Safe Return to Port"?

SRtP is a set of SOLAS regulations (II-1/8-1, II-2/21 and II-2/22) that apply to certain passenger vessels whose keels were laid on or after 1 July 2010, and which:

- Are over 120 metres in length; or
- Have 3 or more main vertical zones.

According to SOLAS, the focus of the SRtP regulations is to, "...establish design criteria for a ship's safe return to port under its own propulsion after a casualty that does not exceed the casualty threshold...and also [provide] functional requirements and performance standards for safe areas."² Notably, it doesn't mention prevention of

loss-of-propulsion/control incidents, only post-casualty return to port.

For spaces protected by a fixed fire-extinguishing system, the casualty threshold is the loss of the space of origin to the nearest class A boundaries; for spaces without a fixed fire-extinguishing system, the casualty threshold includes loss of surrounding spaces as well.

If a fire doesn't exceed the casualty threshold, or flooding remains within a single compartment, the ship should be able to return to port under her own power. If an entire main fire zone is lost, SRtP ships should be able to maintain some essential systems for three hours to allow an "orderly evacuation."

What are the machinery redundancy requirements for SRtP?

To return to port after a casualty, the following systems must be operational:

- Steering, propulsion, and fuel systems
- Navigational systems
- Key internal and external communication systems
- Fire fighting and detection systems
- Bilge, ballast system, and flooding-detection systems
- Power-operated watertight and semi-watertight doors
- Systems to support "safe areas"
- Other systems vital to damage control efforts

To achieve this, ship designers build in redundancy on certain systems, and the system redundancy must be maintained throughout the life of the ship.

How is SRtP approved?

At a high level, SRtP approval is based on Classification Societies' guidelines on how to meet the goal-based criteria set out in the regulations.

The DNV Class Guidelines for SRtP,³ section 3.4 notes that, "The design criteria for the system restoration is that it shall be possible to complete within one hour." They go



on to explain that, "...a wide range of technical solutions could be used to comply with the rules, from system designs that depend fully on manual actions by the crew to fully redundant systems that allow for remote and quick restoration after a casualty."⁴

While DNV's Guidelines do cover fully redundant systems with remote recovery, many ships rely on SRtP systems that depend on manual actions by the crew. This extends the time required for recovery and requires extra documentation and crew training.

Do the SRtP regulations prevent blackouts?

Among seafarers who haven't read the rules, it's a common misconception that SRtP aims to prevent blackouts and loss of power. While SRtP does require redundancy, operational reliability and redundancy are separate and distinct concepts.

Redundancy simply means the vessel is fitted with multiple systems for a particular service, such as propulsion or electrical power; operational reliability refers to the ability to maintain that service, thereby preventing blackouts. Operational reliability usually requires redundancy, but redundancy alone does not guarantee operational reliability. Despite this, redundancy and segregated machinery arrangements can increase the reliability of the systems involved, but only if properly configured.

What is Dynamic Positioning (DP)?

MSC 1580 defines dynamic positioning (DP) as, "A unit or vessel, which automatically maintains its position and/or heading...by means of thruster force." Logically, it follows that a DP system is, "The complete installation necessary for dynamically positioning a vessel comprising, but not limited to, the following sub systems: power system, thruster system, and DP control system."

A DP system is complex, using a range of sensors and computer-controlled thrusters to constantly counter the effects of wind, waves, and currents, holding the DP vessel in a pre-programmed position and orientation, moving it along a pre-planned path, or following a particular moving target.

DP Classes

The IMO describes DP systems as DP1, DP2, or DP3, where DP1 is the simplest, and DP3 the most complex.

DP Class 1

A DP1 vessel can hold station, but has no particular redundancy or operational reliability requirements.

DP Class 2

A DP2 vessel meets the DP1 requirements, but has improved redundancy and operational reliability: even if an active component fails, a DP2 vessel can hold station for long enough to safely stop any work in progress.

Cruise Ship Redundancy *continued.*

DP Class 3

DP3 expands on DP2, with improved redundancy and physical separation of redundant systems. Even if an active component fails or an entire compartment is lost due to fire or flooding, a DP3 vessel can hold station and continue operations—any damage to one system must not affect the backup system.

How are DP systems and designs approved?

Classification Societies approve DP systems and installations, with a strong focus on physical testing and demonstration. According to DNV,⁵ there are five phases before final approval:

1. Factory acceptance test
2. Mechanical completion
3. Pre-commissioning, including loop testing
4. Commissioning
5. Testing, including proving the failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) to demonstrate:
 - a. the redundancy concept
 - b. effectiveness of protective functions
 - c. stability of the system under the full range of load/operational conditions
 - d. monitoring functions
 - e. degraded and failure conditions.

Failure Mode Effect Analysis

Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) of DP vessels and systems assesses single-point failures that could affect the vessel's station-keeping ability. FMEA considers worst-case scenarios where each component and subsystem—including the human operator—is assumed to fail, one probable cause or single act at a time. And it's not just obvious failures: FMEA also accounts for hidden failures, such as those which don't activate an alarm; and considers the impact of having equipment down for routine maintenance.

Do the DP regulations prevent blackouts?

Unlike the SRtP requirements, DP2 and DP3 systems are designed around operational reliability. In particular, the machinery segregation requirements for DP3 are planned so that even multiple active system failures should not result in a blackout or loss-of-position.

Blackouts and Loss of Propulsion/Position

As cruise ships carry the general public on board, short blackouts that would not be reported by the media or officially investigated if they occurred on any other type of ship tend to be widely reported if they happen on cruise ships. This makes the media and Twitter good sources of information about the frequency of cruise ship blackouts. The downside of that is that the media rarely reports on the technical details of interest to mariners, often leaving us to speculate on the facts of the case.

Unlike on cruise ships, where the presence of the general public ensures media scrutiny, blackouts on other merchant ships—including DP ships—can often fly under the radar. To prevent this, IMCA collects reports and publishes anonymised reports of blackouts and loss-of-position on DP ships, allowing other vessels and companies to learn from each other's experiences.

Cruise Ship Blackouts

Even with the machinery redundancy required by SRtP, including multiple generators running, certain failure/configuration combinations can lead to blackouts on today's passenger ships.⁶ In their recent report on passenger ship blackouts,⁷ DNV identified four categories of common-mode failures that can lead to passenger ship blackouts, including:

- **Auxiliaries and sub-system failures, such as:**
 - clogged fuel filters;
 - loss of lube oil suction or cooling water; and
 - fuel management.
- **Maintenance failures across multiple pieces of equipment, such as:**
 - wrong lube oil or grease used in all diesel generators;
 - valves in the wrong position after routine maintenance on all generators;
- **Operational failures, such as mistakes in:**
 - starting and stopping sub-systems;
 - valve operations;
 - fuel changeover;
- **Software-related failures, such as:**
 - defects introduced by software or hardware updates;
 - inadequate integration between multiple systems ;
 - unsupported/out of date operating systems;
 - overwritten or reset vessel parameters; and
 - functionality errors or poor logic, leading to unexpected system behaviour.

Before SRtP

Carnival Triumph 2013

At 05:30 on 10 February 2013, a leaky fuel line started a fire in the aft engine room of the 1999-built cruise ship Carnival Triumph (now Carnival Sunrise). It was automatically extinguished, with no injuries to either passengers or crew; however, she lost all power and propulsion as a result.

Some shipboard functions were partially restored the following day. The official investigation⁸ found the vessel susceptible to a complete loss of power resulting from damage to a single area of the electrical system in the Aft Engine Room.

Although Carnival Triumph was not an SRtP-compliant vessel, DNV's recent report found that SRtP ships are vulnerable to blackouts caused by similar failures, so while SRtP may not have prevented the blackout, the required redundancy and procedures may have facilitated the recovery.

Coral Princess 2020

On the 10th of August 2019, the 2002-built cruise ship Coral Princess left the dock at 20:41. Six minutes later, at 20:47, she blacked out and started drifting towards a vessel at another berth. They started a gas turbine and restored propulsion at 20:55.⁹



Speaking to Alaska Public Media,¹⁰ a Coast Guard investigator blamed the blackout on contaminated lube oil, and an improperly configured second generator. As the vessel is electric propulsion-driven, no generators mean no propulsion.

Would SRtP have helped in this case? Possibly not, as contaminated lube oil is an example of a common-mode failure that, even under SRtP, can cause a blackout. Even so, despite being built 8 years before the SRtP regulations came into force, the Coral Princess managed to recover from the blackout in 8 minutes, well below the 1 hour criterion required by SRtP.

After SRtP

Viking Sky 2019^{11 12}

Built 6 years after SRtP came into force, the 228m cruise ship Viking Sky complies with the SRtP rules. On 23 March 2019, a fire in the aft engine room shut down all three operational diesel generators. Given the weather and the ship's position, the resulting blackout and loss of propulsion prompted the captain to issue a mayday a few minutes later, at 14:00. 40 minutes later and only around 100m from shore, they started one engine. Combined with the anchors, that stopped the vessel's drift towards land.

At around 20:50, they weighed one anchor, "cut loose"¹³ the other, and proceeded towards safer waters under one engine. Two tugs took her under tow at 08:18 the next morning, and they cancelled the mayday at 15:11.

Working on the assumption that the ship was surveyed, in class, and complied with the SRtP regulations, it doesn't appear that the SRtP requirements were adequate to either prevent or recover from the incident. As DNV identified,¹⁴ a single-point failure combined with routine equipment maintenance can cause a blackout in certain equipment configurations, which appears to be what happened here.

Nieuw Statendam 2019

Delivered in late 2018, the Nieuw Statendam "...experienced a technical issue with one of the diesel generators, causing a short black-out..."¹⁵ during a cruise on 23 March 2019. Based on the timing of the tweets from a passenger on board,¹⁶ they appear to have recovered within a few minutes.

While there are few details available about this blackout, on his personal blog, the Fleet Master describes the Nieuw Statendam blackout drill/test during construction.¹⁷ The emergency generator starts automatically, within 10 seconds,¹⁸ operating key equipment including elevators

and lights. If the emergency generator fails, the battery backup keeps "...emergency lighting and other important equipment going for about 30 minutes over the whole ship..." to allow for abandoning ship if required.

In this case, given that power and propulsion were apparently restored within minutes, the system appears to have worked as intended.

DP Vessel Blackouts & Loss-of-Position

Despite the stringent redundancy requirements, DP loss-of-position incidents do still happen.

In a typical IMCA report from 2002,¹⁹ a DP vessel suffered a brief blackout to all systems at 02:56. 11 minutes later, at 03:07, the crew regained control of the vessel; by 03:11, all services had been restored. In the interim, the vessel had moved 190 metres from its original position.

In another report,²⁰ a timer failure at 10:07 triggered a sequence of events that initiated the start/stop sequence for the thrusters. The crew stabilised the situation 9 minutes later at 10:16 after moving a maximum of 40 metres from the intended location.

DP vs SRtP

While detailed public data is restricted for blackouts on both cruise and DP vessels that don't trigger an official investigation, on the surface, there are two key differences between blackouts and machinery failures on DP vessels compared with SRtP vessels:

- on average, recovery is faster for DP vessels than for SRtP vessels; and
- human errors don't cause DP system failures unless there is an underlying technical failure.²¹

According to DNV, "*Enhanced [DP] vessel capability... means a more fault tolerant/fault resistant DP system which minimizes loss of positioning capability post worst case failure.*"²² In contrast, the SRtP regulations' goal is, "...the ability to isolate the casualty and restore operation of the remaining part of the redundant system within a specified time [of 1 hour]."²³

Given the regulations' disparate goals, it's unsurprising that the outcomes are likewise completely different. As the DP regulations are built around operational reliability, the requirement for FMEA on DP vessels forces operators to actively consider and document the causes and consequences of single point failures in order to proactively prevent them from occurring.

Cruise Ship Redundancy *continued.*

While SRtP does contribute something to operational reliability, that's more of a side-effect: it focuses more on planning for post-blackout recovery rather than blackout prevention.

Improving on SRtP

As the MSC Opera demonstrated in Venice in 2020,²⁴ when navigating in close quarters, there's little time for recovery from blackouts or control system failures—it certainly doesn't take a ship an hour to get into trouble while entering or leaving a port. Here, operational reliability is more important than either redundancy or recovery.

When preparing for large passenger vessel movements in ports, channels, and other confined waters, stakeholders must consider the operational reliability of the vessel, rather than relying on the SRtP redundancy requirements.

To make this easier, DNV has introduced 2 voluntary class notations:

- Operational reliability (OR); and
- Redundant propulsion (RP).

Drawing on DP principles and practices, the OR notation extends the SRtP requirements to address operational reliability, blackout prevention, and system recovery. It focuses on three areas:

1. enhanced reliability and quick recovery of propulsion, steering and electrical power (ER);
2. enhanced manoeuvring reliability (EMR) of thrusters and the DP system; and
3. operational flexibility and predictability (OP) during machinery damage or maintenance.

The RP notations ensure redundant propulsion and steering systems are arranged so that, after a single failure, propulsion and steering can be recovered within a specified time. For the RP(2,x) notation, the failure modes include component failure, while RP(3,x) systems are segregated to cover fire and flooding. The additional "+" qualifier indicates the systems are designed for continuous availability.

When manoeuvring in confined waters, OR and RP+ vessels may present lower risks than standard SRtP vessels. For ports and pilots, an understanding of the differences is critical when conducting risk assessments and setting port policies for entry and departure.

Conclusion

Although they have a superficial resemblance, SRtP and DP have different goals. Because of the nature of their work, a loss of position on a DP vessel can be immediately critical, so the goals and redundancy for DP are far more stringent than those for SRtP.

Today, a passenger ship in full compliance with the SRtP regulations can suffer a single-point failure of a critical system in a narrow channel or port approach in the same way as pre-SRtP. An hour to change-over to the backup system is plenty of time in open water; in most ports and approaches, an engine or steering failure can get a vessel into serious trouble in seconds or minutes, not hours.

On a DP2/3 vessel, the operating wind and current limits are based on their operating capabilities following a single-point failure. Given most passenger ships' high windage, this approach could provide an extra layer of safety.

DNV's OR and RP notations go some way to addressing this problem, giving crew, ports and pilots a better understanding of a particular vessel's specific risks. Whatever the reason, the potential consequences of blackouts and loss of control during manoeuvring remain a problem that must be considered and addressed.



Captain Nic Gardner
Marine Technology Analyst

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Pilots are not advisors to Masters

According to the International Group of P & I Clubs' "Report on P&I claims involving vessels under pilotage 1999-2019", over the last twenty years, there were 1,046 incidents in which pilot error either caused or contributed to those events. The resulting liabilities were in excess of US\$1.82 billion, with the average value per incident of approximately US\$1.74 million. The Report considered incidents such as Allision/Contact with Fixed or Floating Objects (constituting 60% of the total number), Collision, Grounding and Navigation, including incidents caused by the wash of a vessel.

The report stated that since "the pilot has the conduct of the navigation and the shipowner remains vicariously responsible for liabilities arising from the pilots' acts or negligence... whenever incidents occur that result in substantial P&I liabilities ... the question arises of whether there is any liability on the part of the pilot or the relevant pilotage body, and whether insurance coverage for such liability exists. ... even where recourse is possible, the potential levels of financial liability are often low and such liability may not be covered by insurance. ... therefore ... widespread legislative change and associated insurance regimes is considered unrealistic... "

Liability on the part of Shipowners and Pilots calls for just a brief look into the history of law regulating compulsory Pilotage.

Over centuries, Pilots were held liable for damage caused to other ships or objects during compulsory pilotage, while Shipowners and Masters had absolute freedom from claims.

Not to go too far back in time, the last body of law relieving Shipowners and Masters of a piloted vessel from any liability for damage caused by Pilots was the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, stating: "*An owner or master of a ship shall not be answerable to any person whatever for any loss or damage occasioned by the fault or incapacity of any qualified pilot acting in charge of that ship within any district where the employment of a qualified pilot is compulsory by law*".

The obvious issue was the insufficient financial capability of compensation for damages on the part of the Pilot.

The scales tipped in Pilots' favour in the early 20th century. The UK Pilotage Act, bringing major change and shift of liability was enacted in 1913. Article 15 states: "*... the owner or master of a vessel navigating under circumstances in which pilotage is compulsory shall be answerable for any loss or damage caused by the vessel or by any fault of the navigation of the vessel in the same manner as he would if pilotage were not compulsory*".

With slightly different wording, this particular rule remained the same in the current 1987 Pilotage Act imposing liability for accidents during compulsory pilotage onto Shipowners and Masters.

The Act allows for compulsory Pilots to be held liable, but their liability is limited to a symbolic amount of £1,000 in the UK and a similar amount in other jurisdictions. As a result, Shipowners became the primary source of compensation for damages through their P & I Clubs.

In much of the rest of the world, Port States took it one step further and, while imposing compulsory pilotage and authorising Pilots to take control of the navigation of ships plying their ports to secure the safety of both ships and ports, define Pilots as mere 'advisors' to Masters, thus effectively exempting Pilots from any liability arising out of their acts or omissions, also imposing responsibility onto Masters for any loss or damage caused by the ship regardless of the fact that the ship was under compulsory pilotage.

Pilots' responsible task of bringing ships in and out of ports safely could hardly be achieved if they were only advisors to Masters.

Advice has no elements of compulsion. Advice can be accepted or rejected. If Pilots were advisors, then Masters would be in charge of manoeuvring the vessel, with their own choice of courses to steer and speed to maintain including control of tug boats.

Of course, in practice, this is not the case. Pilots are tasked with control of navigation as experts on local conditions and on manoeuvring which they perform day in and day out in the same port or other compulsory pilotage area assigned to them.

On the other hand, Masters are not experts on manoeuvring due to the simple fact that they have limited opportunity to manoeuvre and in the case of very large ships with single propeller they cannot manoeuvre at very slow speeds in confined waters without the use of tugboats.

And yet, Masters are expected to override Pilots' orders and intervene when Pilots' actions appear inadequate and pose risk to the safety of the ship. The problem here is that the Master's perception of risk does not have to coincide with the much more experienced Pilot's perception, in which case the Master's intervention could make the situation worse.

And when a manoeuvre appears to go wrong or indeed goes wrong and requires intervention, it is right next to impossible to correct it. This is especially true when tugboats are in use, over which Masters have no control.

As a result, the person in the spotlight of accidents that occur under compulsory pilotage is the Master of the ship.

In the aftermath of an accident, it is not only about the Master's loss of reputation, or loss of employment and employment prospects. What gets largely ignored is the psychological impact of dealing with blame for being incompetent or negligent, even though the control of navigation belonged to the Pilot.

The only bright exception to the rule of considering Pilots as advisors to Masters is the Panama Canal where Pilots take absolute control of navigation through the Canal and are liable in case of an accident.

Regulations on Navigation in Panama Canal Waters, Chapter V, Article 92 states: "The pilot assigned to a vessel shall have control of the navigation and movement of such a vessel.

This simple, unambiguous rule is supported by the Panama Canal Authority accepting to "pay indemnity for damages ... if the damage was caused through fault or negligence on the part of the Authority or its workers in the performance and within the scope of their duties..."

The convoluted Master / Pilot relationship has been the subject of much debate and much has been written on the topic.

While the industry concentrates on improving the interaction between Masters and Pilots, Capt. George Quick gives a concise and to the point explanation of the issue in his brilliant article "Master / Pilot relationship; the role of the pilot in risk management", where Capt. Quick states that the starting point in solving the issue is understanding the role of the Pilot. And the role is certainly not advisory.

If the industry considers it unrealistic to change compulsory pilotage legislation, then at least the impossible expectations and the terrible burden of blame should be removed from Masters' shoulders by "widening the circle

of responsibility to include pilots, port authorities, terminal operators, VTS operations, channel maintenance and navigation aids, and all the various regulatory agencies in the circle of blame after a casualty", as Capt. Quick rightfully points out.

Accidents under compulsory pilotage are not the only issue that seafarers have to deal with, but, on a positive note, there are still men and women willing to go to sea and take command although "the traditional privilege and honour associated with command appears instead to have become a risky and perilous burden" due to an ever-increasing range of responsibilities, but incommensurate legal rights.

International Group of P&I Clubs: Report on P&I claims involving vessels under pilotage 1999-2019

Capt. George Quick: Master/Pilot relationship; the role of the pilot in risk management

The Standard Club: Pilotage bulletin



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
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Digitising pilotage **PEER LEARNING**



Introduction

If a marine pilot had wings, they would fly above the ship – not perch in the wheelhouse.

To capitalize on the above notion a new digital service to compliment marine pilot training has been introduced by capturing actual pilotage operations using drone, sound and “video cam” technology and creating a training library of selected videos for selected ports.

Pilotage related accidents/incidents can have enormous financial implications as was demonstrated in the Ever Given Suez Canal incident. Even a collision with a single gantry crane can result in claims in excess of USD 20 million.

A recent survey, interviewing marine pilots from all over the world, revealed a consensus that an average of 80% of a marine pilots training was made through learning from peers - i.e., whilst on board a vessel observing a trained pilot.

This methodology of training is thought to have been in existence since marine pilotage began, hundreds of years ago and, to date, little has changed to improve or advance marine pilot peer learning.

Drone video and sound technology has however now offered an opportunity to archive imagery and the wheelhouse voices of a trained pilot at work via operational videos. Trainee pilots can therefore watch these videos and ask questions at their leisure.

This medium will also enable trainee pilots to commence their on board and simulator training having already witnessed and assessed experienced pilots conning ships in and out of a port, the same port where their training will soon commence. Experienced pilots can also refresh their minds on complex jobs where vessel numbers are low leading to a lack of the desired regular exposure to these manoeuvres.

Compiling the operational videos

The training videos for each individual port are filmed under instruction from the port/terminal. Typically, the port will be expected to “order” videos for pilotage operations that are difficult due to e.g. berth space, currents, swell, vessel, wind, vessel propulsion, vessel draft or vessel size.

Once the menu is established the video shooting commences. The pilot is fitted with a high-fidelity recording device that captures all the dialogue from the pilot, tugs, VTS and the vessels bridge team.

A video cam camera is also placed in the wheelhouse to capture the “bridge wing” view or the vessels manoeuvring data so that comparisons between the arial view and the wheelhouse view can be made. Data from the pilots PPU is also collected and converted into a video format. The video cam and PPU imagery are include in the drone video as insets.

The drone imagery is captured via a drone flying at 120 meters above the vessel, mostly from behind the funnel and in line with the foremast. This positioning allows the viewer to follow the fore and aft line of the vessel as it is steered through a channel and into the inner basin of the port. On occasions the drone is directed to move from the default position to highlight/illustrate turning basin clearances if considered useful information to a training pilot.

The viewer therefore has a real time arial view of the vessel whilst at the same hearing all the pilots’ commands. The PPU imagery, the view from the wheelhouse and all the other dialogue from the wheelhouse are all complimentary to drone imagery.

The deliverable:

The completed videos are vetted by the port and when approved are uploaded into a "log in and log out" secure APP with filters. This allows the viewer to select various technical pilotage criteria in order to view the most appropriate video for the particular training need.

The APP also auto records what videos have been watched and by whom and allows for typed comments to be made against certain clips...that all identified by the video time counter. This facilitates the pilot training system at the port to monitor the "top hits" by individual pilots and any comments that the viewing pilot has posted.


Conclusion:

The drone pilot training APP adds a new dimension to marine pilot peer learning. The videos enhance the opportunity for the training pilot to methodically analyse how a senior and experienced pilot manoeuvres a ship in

the port taking into account the different variables that he or she may soon experience. This knowledge can then create a solid base of understanding before the physical onboard training, has even started.

Other advantages are:

- A solid video history of good practice and training should an incident ever cause the ports marine operations to be challenged. The video history can also be used to defend a port's "safe port" tag, which can be extremely attractive to charterers who are required to only send chartered vessels to ports that are safe for a particular vessel.
- The skills of senior and experienced pilots need are not lost to the new generation of pilots when retirements occur.
- Training can be speeded up where vessel numbers are low at certain terminals resulting in a slow turnover of terminal specific licence training.



**Captain
Clive Sheard**
*Senior Marine
Consultant ABL*



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MAKING MARINE OPERATIONS SAFER AND MORE EFFICIENT, EVERY TIME, EVERYWHERE

A 1000 Navy Vessels *Around...*

HOW MANY ARE COMPLIANT TO SOLAS CH.V REG23 ?

(DO THEY HAVE TO AT ALL????)

As a pilot you come across a wide variety of ships. Amongst all those ships we bring in and out of ports all over the world several of them belong to the navies of the various countries of this same world. Quite often those vessels have the tendency of presenting themselves with a pilot transfer arrangement which is non-compliant i.a.w. SOLAS ch.V reg.23, IMO A.1045, ISO799-1/2019 etc.etc..

Let's focus on SOLAS in this article because it has been accepted as international law worldwide (reg. 23 talks about REQUIREMENTS). IMO provides RECOMMENDATIONS and has not been accepted as law worldwide: a recommendation is often defined as a guideline and not a rule, despite the fact the some of the recommendations have been in the IMO A.1045 for over 40 years... And as far as the ISO goes: it hasn't been accepted as the worldwide standard everywhere (yet...)

We know when SOLAS started; back in 1914, after the sinking of the Titanic the first version of this treaty has passed. In the more than 100 years of its existence it has been amended and updated many times. It provides the basic rules, or the minimum standards for vessels in Safety of Life at Sea.

What would make navy vessels think they don't have to comply with such important basic rules? Well, I do understand you cannot throw SOLAS approved bombs at each other, but where does this come from?

So, let's have a look at SOLAS, it's only 910 pages...

Chapter I, regulation 1 explains:

- (a) Unless expressly provided otherwise, the present Regulations apply only to ships engaged on international voyage...
- (b) The classes of ships to which each Chapter applies are more precisely defined, and the extent of the application is shown, in each Chapter.

So, the text above basically excludes all inland marine traffic from these rules. Each chapter will explain to what kind of vessel the specific chapter applies...

Regulation 3 provides us with the exceptions:

- (a) The present Regulations, unless provided otherwise, do not apply to:
 - (i) Ships of war and troopships
 - (ii) Cargo ships of less than etc.etc.



Photo's courtesy of the Dangerousladders page on Facebook



Non-compliant and dangerous setup

A 1000 Navy Vessels Around... *continued.*

Would this mean that Navy vessels don't have to comply to any rule at all? That's strange.. SOLAS has just told us that we'd have to look at the specific chapter, so let's move on to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) and see if there are any exemptions here.

Chapter V starts with the application and explains:

1. Unless expressly provided otherwise, this chapter shall apply to all ships on all voyages, except:
 - .1 warships, naval auxiliaries and other ships owned or operated by a Contracting Government and used only on government non-commercial service and... etc.

This means navy vessels are excluded from ch.V... BUT (here's the but...) there is an explanation a bit further down the text saying: However, warships... are ENCOURAGED to act in a matter consistent, so far as reasonable and practicable, with this chapter.

Well, isn't that nice? SOLAS encourages the navy, this basically means nothing: you can for example encourage your pet to stop destroying your furniture, but the pet isn't obliged to comply because it's not a rule but a kind of recommendation.

This article could stop here, stating navy can do anything, but I thought there must be regulation on navy ships.. they would have to comply with something I would say, every seafarer wants to be as safe as possible and the same goes for navy service personnel.

Regulation 23 starts with the application stating:

Ships engaged on voyages in the course of which pilots may be employed, shall be provided with pilot transfer arrangements. Ok, fair enough, but we have just seen that navy vessels are excluded from chapter V...



Another unsafe example

Since I come from the Netherlands, I thought easiest would be to look at the rules our Royal Navy is subjected to. In national law there isn't much to find on it but internationally I came across a very interesting set of rules to which our Dutch navy vessels must comply. The Netherlands Royal Navy is a member state of NATO. NATO has currently 30 member states, so that means quite a lot of navy ships worldwide are in NATO. SOLAS has 164 member states, so

this is roughly about 20% of the total...

We have read a bit back in the article, that states are encouraged to comply as much as possible etc. etc. Well, NATO has laid down a standard with the official name ANEP-77 NAVAL SHIP CODE Edition E Version 1 (do keep in mind this is all found on the internet and isn't NATO classified in any way).

I had never heard of this set of rules, and I even have served in the navy many years back, it was well before 2014 so that might explain it.



Would they use it themselves????

First let's find out what this ANEP thing is.. In the introduction it starts with the AIM, which says:

The overall aim of the Naval Ship Code is to provide a standard for naval surface ship based on and benchmarked against IMO conventions and resolutions that embraces the majority of ships operated by navies (728 pages..)

Are all NATO vessels subjected to these rules? Unless expressly provided otherwise, the present regulations apply only to naval surface ships that are not nuclear powered. In the ladder section we'll see what is suitable there.

So, NATO took on the challenge of the 'encouraging' text and came up with their own set of rules. Basically, you could state it is an amended copy of SOLAS, but more suitable for navy ships. Since you might know I have a professional interest in pilot transfer arrangements, we'll leaf through the section that covers that item.



Very unsafe again

The rules on pilot transfer arrangements have been laid down in Regulation 11 Pilot Transfer Arrangements (page IX-27) and the functional objective is as follows:

Ships engaged on voyages in the course of which pilots may be employed, shall be provided with pilot transfer arrangements for the safe transfer of pilots from either side of the vessel.

There it is... no loopholes, no exceptions here... This sentence sounds a bit familiar doesn't it? As I stated above, a lot of the text in ANEP77 is indeed a copy of the text in SOLAS and even some IMO resolutions.

The text ends with: **The requirements of SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 23 and IMO Resolution A.1045(27) shall be met.** This is an important one: NATO states here that all pilot transfer arrangements shall be compliant to SOLAS and IMO. So, whenever a NATO navy ship claims they do not have to be SOLAS compliant (a stupid excuse for not having to be safe...), you can revert to the ANEP77 and tell them that according to the ANEP77 their pilot transfer arrangement has to be SOLAS and IMO compliant.

I am very curious how these items are countered in non-NATO countries (which is the vast majority of navy ships of course). Language as well as different types of writing (Chines, Japanese, Korean, Cyrillic etc etc) are a big barrier for me to get into it. If anyone who reads this article, has any information on it, please let me know. At least we have covered about 20% of the world's navy fleet with this article, only 80% left.. On the next page you'll find a copy of the respective ANEP text on ladders.

I hope this article will be of any assistance in the attempt of getting to work and back in one piece (commuting is the most dangerous part of our job after all). Please stay safe and healthy everyone!! Kind Regards,



Captain Arie Palmers
Marine Pilot - Nederlands Loodswezen

Gereed ANEP-77E_VER-1_JAN2014 (5 van 23)

Regulation 11 Pilot Transfer Arrangements

Functional Objective

- 1 Ships engaged on voyages in the course of which pilots may be employed shall be provided with pilot transfer arrangements for the safe transfer of pilots from either side of the vessel.

Performance Requirements

- 2 The pilot transfer station shall be located such that it provides safe and unobstructed access for any person embarking on or disembarking from the vessel.
- 3 Arrangements permitting pilot access to, or egress from the vessel should be either available on both sides of the ship, or be capable of being transferred for use on either side.
- 4 Effective means of communication, in accordance with Chapter VIII, are to be provided between the Navigation Bridge, pilot station and pilot vessel.
- 5 Adequate lighting shall be provided to illuminate the transfer arrangements outside and the position on deck where a person embarks or disembarks.

IX-27 Edition E Version 1

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ANEP 77

- 6 Crew engaged in the operation of mechanical equipment or rigging shall be adequately instructed in the safe procedure for their use.
- 7 All equipment used in the transfer operation should be maintained and tested in accordance with manufacturers' specifications or to a recognised standard.

Solutions

- 8 The ship, systems and equipment are to be approved in accordance with the following paragraphs. Alternatively the Naval Administration may agree to the use of validated classification society's rules, international convention or a suitable validated alternative or additional standard to facilitate verification of the performance requirements.
- 9 The requirements of SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 23 and IMO Resolution A.1045(27) shall be met.

Meanwhile in Brisbane...

Competition and succession in pilotage provision nearly always provoke bitter dispute and heated debate – bitter dispute between those responsible for maritime safety and those who compete to provide services, and heated debate between practitioners, stakeholders, and observers alike. The events that have unfolded in Brisbane recently are no exception.

To be clear, the issue here is not service providers competing to provide parallel services to shipowners or port operators. It is about providers competing for the right to sell their services to the statutory monopoly holder – Maritime Safety Queensland.

For us in New Zealand, pilotage in Australian ports may appear to be a fragmented mix of pilots employed by Port Authorities or States and pilots who are employed by, or stakeholders in, private pilotage companies. But there are historic reasons for the status quo.

Before the Commonwealth of Australia came into being in 1901, each of the states were individual colonies and legislation had evolved separately in each. New Zealand came close to becoming one of these states. After federation, maritime law was enacted by each state government, so each began from a different start point. Although influenced by federal bodies (I'll come to that later) and bound by international convention, maritime law and hence regulation of ports and pilotage remained the responsibility of the state governments.

With the exception of Port Phillip Sea pilots, which has been a private company since 1839, pilots became employees of the state governments after federation. The first private pilotage companies came into being in the late 1980's and were a product of the privatisation initiatives of governments in that era.

Pilotage services were privatised in Brisbane in 1989 and until January 1st, 2022, there had been only one service provider – Brisbane Marine Pilots (BMP).

Maritime Safety Queensland (MSQ) are an agency of the Queensland Government created by the Maritime Safety Queensland Act. The act gives them their authority and provides oversight of their function.

The Transport Operation (Maritime Safety) Act 1994, another Queensland Government act defines, among other things, each pilotage area in Queensland and names the responsible pilotage entities for each area. It names MSQ the responsible pilotage entity for the Brisbane, Southport and Abbott Point pilotage areas. That responsibility requires that MSQ provides or arranges for the provision of pilotage services in those areas. It also allows MSQ to appoint harbour masters.

In short MSQ are the sole body responsible for providing pilotage services or appointing a pilotage service provider, and they are duty bound to monitor and direct operations with respect to maritime safety.

Brisbane is Queensland's largest general cargo port and one of the fastest growing multi-cargo ports in Australia. There are over 2500 vessel visits annually. There are currently 9 dedicated container berths at Fisherman Island and a further 4 berths that cater for general cargo and motor vehicles.

There is an oil refinery and multiple bulk liquid terminals. Crude oil is one of the port's principal imports. Other imports include fertilisers, chemicals, motor vehicles, cement clinker and gypsum, paper and building products and machinery. Exports include coal, refined oils, grain, woodchips, mineral sand, scrap metal, meat products and cotton. Cruise ships are catered for at the cruise ship terminal at Hamilton and the new Brisbane International Cruise Terminal at Luggage Point. Naval vessels are also frequent visitors. It's a large operation.

Port of Brisbane Pty Ltd (PBPL) manage and develop the port under the terms of a 99-year leasehold agreement with Queensland Government. They are privately owned by a consortium of domestic and overseas funds, having been sold by the Queensland Government in July 2010.

Immediately prior to the sale, in June 2010, BMP applied to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) for authorisation for an exclusive arrangement to be allowed between Brisbane Marine Pilots and Maritime Safety Queensland in relation to the provision of pilotage services at the Port of Brisbane. The application was denied.

ACCC are a federal body whose stated purpose is twofold:

1. To promote competition and fair trade to benefit customers, businesses, and the community
2. To ensure compliance with the Competition and Consumer Act 2010.

BMP's application was denied by ACCC in line with the principals above, but also and interestingly, along the lines that they didn't need exclusivity to be formally authorised because they effectively already enjoyed it by virtue of the service agreement between themselves and MSQ.

It seems that by this ruling, although obliged by ACCC to go to the market, MSQ would not be penalised for maintaining the services of BMP under the Consumer and Competition Act if they followed a fair and transparent tendering process.

At that time, industry observers assumed that that process would take place in 2013, when the service agreement came up for renewal. As things turned out, the agreement

was renewed in 2013 and an open tendering process was not announced by the Queensland Government until December 2019. The agreement term was set at 10 years with an option of an additional 5. The estimated value of the agreement was \$241M AUD and a closing date for applications was set at August 2020. The incumbent (BMP) submitted a tender, as did Poseidon Sea Pilots (PSP) and Auriga Pty Ltd.

On 8th January 2021 PSP were announced as the successful applicant. This came as a big surprise to many. Although the tenders themselves and the decision process are not publicly available, MSQ state that tenders were considered by an independent panel appointed by Queensland Government and that probity auditors were present throughout.

So, what reasons might there be for MSQ to replace BMP as the service provider?

Up until 1st January, BMP engaged 32 pilots to provide an "on demand" service to the shipping volumes described earlier.

Their website promotes core values of Safety, Service Excellence, Collaboration, Sustainability and Integrity. They have a strong commitment to innovation and continuous improvement. In my experience from interactions at the Sydney AMPI conference in 2019 they are early adopters of fresh ideas.

Peter Liley, a licensed Brisbane pilot and former Managing Director of BMP talks of a collaborative and open culture and a good working relationship with MSQ. He describes a very strong quorum of pilots with considerable depth of knowledge and experience and an efficient safety management system. They have built a culture, reputation and a brand that is recognised globally. KPI's aligning with their core values comprising operational efficiencies, compliance with regulation, procedure and quality standards, incident and near miss reporting were regularly discussed with MSQ with agreed strategies formed to address any shortfalls. He is unaware of any dissatisfaction with the service provided by BMP. Their tender was based on continued service and continuous improvement.

Steve Pelecanos, Director of PSP, was the first pilot to join BMP after privatisation back in 1989. With John Watkinson, ex GM of MSQ, as his co-Director and Rob Buck as General Manager, PSP they have put together a team of motivated pilots. Their operations plan engages 28 pilots to service the same shipping volumes.

PSP's headline message is "reconceptualising pilotage". Steve explains this as "merging today's reality with the emerging reality of the industry of the future". His vision, and PSP's, is to harness new technologies, big data, advances in safety science and the understanding of human factors to improve pilotage outcomes.

No modern pilot worth his salt would argue with that philosophy.

PSP are wholly owned by Australian Maritime Systems whose core business is communications and navigation infrastructure and technology. Steve cites this as a good fit for a pilotage provider that wants technology to be at the heart of what they do.

In a nutshell, whilst both tenders comprised detailed business and operations plans, the choice presented to the independent panel was safe hands (BMP) versus progressive thinker (PSP) and a difference in price.

The problem for PSP was that in January 2021, they lacked licenses for the Brisbane pilotage area. Add to that an absent contractual obligation for BMP to assist during the transition and things start to get difficult. With this backdrop, claim and counter claim went back and forth between PSP, BMP and MSQ about the levels of cooperation between them.

Regardless of who said what and when, the facts are that BMP did not facilitate PSP pilots on any piloted vessels for training, neither was there any contractual obligation for them to do so.

Faced with that particular emerging reality, PSP were forced to rely more heavily on simulator-based skills training and competency assessment. MSQ issued the pilots licenses and PSP duly commenced pilotage operations on 1st January 2022.

From an observer's perspective, it appears that a good, safe pilotage provider with 30 years' experience and a good track record, has been replaced with a provider with good ideas and a vision of the future. It's a vision shared by many globally, and in the past 5 years or so, the industry has been waking up to it in various locations.

But when MSQ made their choice to go with the vision, did they adequately consider the risks? What if, in the absence of any obligation, BMP provided no assistance with the transition? When the pilots hold a financial stake in the company, why would they? It would be naive to think otherwise.

In the absence of any live training for the incoming pilots, is the risk of a maritime incident raised? I suggest that it is.

Most regulators and probably all mariners and training institutions will be aware of the benefits and limitations of simulator training. There are numerous papers on the subject in the maritime and aviation industry. In aviation, where simulation has proven true to life fidelity and performance, live training continues to be a requisite.

In the maritime space, simulator fidelity is continuously improving, and in Brisbane Smartship have developed an industry leading facility. But is the fidelity close enough to real life to replace live training? And has the behaviour of an individual in the simulator compared to that in real world operations been fully addressed? If so, it's a study worth publishing.

Meanwhile in Brisbane... *continued.*

PSP openly concede that their mobilisation plan, which formed part of their tender, included live training augmented with simulator training. In the circumstances, their live training was confined to completing the necessary transits on a 90m dredge which PSP chartered.

In this light, can MSQ honestly say that due diligence has been exercised?

Competition isn't the problem here, but poor governance is – specifically the management of succession. The body with a statutory responsibility for maritime safety in the region has overseen and been party to a service agreement that does not require a handover from the incumbent provider at the end of the term. They then compounded that error by replacing the provider.

In an age where the highest level of care and diligence is rightly expected of practitioners, should we not expect the same of those with statutory authority?



Captain Matt Conyers

NZMPA VP and Editor

Nelson & Queen Charlotte Sound Pilot

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Interviews with Peter Liley and Steve Pelecanos



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
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Australia's Maritime FUTURE CONFERENCE 2022



This was the title chosen by the organising committee appreciating that this was the first major maritime conference to be held in Australia for more than 2 years, and the realisation that potential maritime industry speakers, delegates, and sponsors would be keen to attend.

As a precursory note, although we are a group of maritime professionals with unique skill sets, we are an integral part of the Australian maritime industry, and it was thought that it would afford kudos to AMPI to invite and share the stage with others. It acknowledges that we are visible and open to be invited to similar conferences hosted by other maritime industry bodies.

The timing was, in hindsight unfortunate, as it was the week of the federal budget and the budget reply, and it was also a sitting week at state parliament. The various relevant federal and state MPs were contacted to attend but of course were unable to do so. The reason to have the conference in Wollongong was at the time thought to be prudent because there was a lot of uncertainty about what was happening in other states with regards to opening their borders post-Covid.

The conference venue, **Novotel Wollongong**, was excellent as it had sufficient room to have the conference and to host the sponsors/exhibitors in the adjacent gallery space. Including presenters, we had about 130 attending, which fluctuated according to individual's schedules.

The event took place over 2.5 days with an introductory ice breaker event the evening before the conference began so that delegates could once again mingle and get to each other in a relaxed atmosphere.

The conference began on Wednesday 30th March with a **Welcome to Country** offered by **Richard Davies** from the **Illawarra Aboriginal Corporation** welcoming us to the land of the Dharawal people. The conference then kicked off in earnest with **Kendall Carter** as MC.

Peter Dann (AMPI President) offered the opening address on AMPI's behalf, thanking all who had contributed, and to those attending the first such conference in quite some time.

John Finch, COO PANSW, provided the keynote speech outlining the key conference themes. He then laid out an overview of the role PANSW has now and looking into the future with regards to sustainability and new technology. He mentioned the constructive role that pilots play in meeting customer expectations and the responsibility that AMPI has shown in leading the way on innovation and forward thinking.



Margie Barbouttis, Ports Australia Policy & Operations Director, in her debut speech Margie spoke about how sustainability is imperative for Australian ports to maintain their longevity. Ports Australia has published a guide to enable ports to individually assess the extent to which their administrative and operational functions are

sustainable and help them develop strategies to improve on their sustainability status.

Richard Rouse (AMPI Dep. President) afforded the audience with a thought-provoking presentation on port risk management. He identified key points that we, as pilots, manage and deal with on an ongoing basis; namely DUKC, Simulator training, and PPU's and their limitations and pitfalls. He spoke about ship diversity and how that sits with the growing interest in autonomous ships.

Christine Field, CEO Hunterlink, was invited to present about her organisations work supporting international seafarers. She outlined the extent of Hunterlink's professional network of psychologists and similar professionals here in Australia and overseas. She then talked about the reasons why seafarers contact them; examples include isolation, and mental health and the need for confidentiality.



Jillian Carson Jackson, NI President, had an extended presentation where she engaged in workshop style experiments that led the delegates to understand that the same input can lead to an outcome that is individually different. Also, that digital intelligence and tackling the digital divide

in psychologically/physically safe environments were indicated to be the best way to address human capital in shipping that came out of a poll that Jillian conducted towards her close.

Teresa Lloyd, CEO Maritime Industry Australia, spoke about possible solutions to the problem of a declining fleet that MIAL have formulated. The federal government needs to act specifically with regards to tax reform incentives to encourage shipping companies to invest in an Australian international shipping register. The solution would also include training subsidies and/or government funded training pathways.



Jonathan Kempe, CEO & Founder/Host of Let's Supply Chain AsiaPac, had a most interesting title to his talk: "Temet Nosce" or Know Thyself. Jonathan identifies that Australia has a proud history of being a fierce defender and adversary. While we are self-deprecating at times, when our values, way

of life, or principles are endangered, we rise to meet the challenge or challenger with grit and determination. But what will it take for Australia to be a global leader in the maritime domain?

Alison Cusack; Cusack & Co Maritime Lawyers. SureShoring address the whole of supply chain and the interconnected challenges of seafarer welfare, environmental sustainability, technology advancements, equipment and space confidence all wrapped up with ethical contracting. How will the demands of the consumer interplay and be a lever that effects more rapid change than governments alone can achieve?

Michael Gallacher, CEO Ports Australia, crucially referred to the fact the public have over the last two years realised that stuff comes from overseas and comes here on ships that arrive at our ports. The supply chain has been disrupted and the public, now at least, have

AMPI Conference 2022 *continued.*



an understanding that we are an island nation, and that the shipping industry is fundamentally important to their everyday lives.

The gala dinner at a restaurant overlooking the beach was well attended. **Canon Gary Dodd, Newcastle MTS; Sister Mary Leahy, Sydney Stella Maris Chaplain and John Kewa, Port Kembla Chaplain MTS** opened the dinner with a short speech. They were very appreciative of the invitation to attend the conference and spoke about their ongoing work assisting seafarers. Sister Mary then said Grace.

Following the entrée course **Peter Ernst, Head of Regional Ports PANSW**, and long-time Port Kembla resident recounted the history and evolution of the port. Once main course was consumed, we continued with our raffle to raise money for the MTS and Stella Maris. The prizes were all generously donated by the sponsors. The invited dinner speaker, **Emma Malik** had us in fits of laughter as she described how she became an animal trainer and the hilarious situations she found herself in.

The raffle ticket sales enabled AMPI to donate the sum of \$1000 to each of the three port seafarer welfare organisations. This was an achievement that AMPI should be proud of.



Jeanine Drummond, Integral Maritime, metaphorically hit the nail on the head with her presentation “The future is now: Thinking & Acting differently”.

It was about the thinking and the behaviour that is required to bring to the fore to

promote the maritime industry. Seek alternative pathways to attract and encourage those who wish to become maritime professionals, and specifically maritime pilots.

This theme was carried on in the presentation from **Mehrangiz Shahbakhsh, PhD candidate, and Dr. Reza Emad from AMC (UTAS)** who laid out the historical evolution of the seafarer and the ships they sail on. What

became apparent from their research is the emergence of what is termed a Maritime Operator 4.0. The players in the future maritime workforce are to be redefined and who will now require a new training regime not only for the technology that now exists but also for what is coming.

A regular to our conferences is **Dr. Matthew Thomas** whose presentation was entitled: “Please don’t fight with the robot.....”. The evolving maritime environment will see significant changes in workforce composition, including a very different profile in port operations teams. We will see significant increases in automation and a range of forms of artificial intelligence integrated directly into bridge teams and beyond. This in turn will change the nature of BRM and drive the need for a new set of core non-technical skills.

Nick Bonser, autonomous maritime instructor AMC Search talked about Autonomous and remotely operated vessels; they are no longer a thing of the future, they are our present. But what do we know about them and how will it affect seafarers and our ports? He outlined the developments in training of autonomous vessel operators in Australian waters. He went on to share what he and the other members of the Nautical Institute’s Automated Technology Advisory Group (ATAG) are doing to keep industry up to date with MASS developments.

Rachel Horne is the Director of Autonomy Accreditation – Maritime at Trusted Autonomous Systems’ (TAS). Rachel’s presentation was about the future of autonomous systems and the regulatory framework in Australia. It seeks to establish a Body of Knowledge on the assurance and accreditation of autonomous systems, and to develop the Australian Code of Practice for the Design, Construction, Survey and Operation of Autonomous and Remotely Operated Vessels.

Lindsay Cavanagh, senior pilot Port Authority of NSW, Sydney presented on his development of an eMPX. VTS now communicates with vessels via email prior to a ship’s arrival to gather critical important static information such as drafts, displacement, stability data and operational status of machinery. The gathering of information prior to the pilot boarding allows for the identification and confirmation of issues allowing the pilot to make better use of the “MPX



time". The manual collection and continual re-entry of data by various personnel will become obsolete and a pre-prepared pilotage plans will be automatically pushed to the allocated pilot via email.



Richard Dunham, AMC Simulator Manager, talked about current seafarer training and whether it assists pilots. STCW currently provides the basic standards internationally for the training and certification of seafarers.


Is it possible to identify the skills which a pilotage organisation would require of a novice pilot before employment? If these skills are not part of these minimum training and certification requirements, where should the novice pilot gain them? Is there a need, to amend STCW to include the skills required? Is there an alternative method of training which would allow a novice pilot to start with an improved skill set?

Tim Visser from CAE at RAAF base at Williamstown, provided an aviation industry perspective on simulators. He talked about simulator limitations and the need to provide the user with quality training that is pertinent to the desired outcomes and the level of realism required. In the aviation sector simulators are regulated and must meet accredited standards. Editor's note: Contrast this with maritime simulators that are yet to reach this level of oversight.

Peter Dann wrapped up conference proceedings with a brief recap of the conferences topics and thanked the speakers, delegates and sponsors for their support.



Captain Rob Tanner
Marine Pilot – Port Kembla





Though Australia's shipping has come a long way from the export of whale oil over 200 years ago, it is in the last 10 years that Australian shipping has experienced the most exponential change. This period has coincided with Smartship Australia's first 10 years of operation.

During the past decade Australia has become the largest exporter in the world of iron ore and LNG, the second largest exporter in the world of coal, and one of the most popular destination for cruise ships. The volume of cargo in Australian ports has increased by 300% during the past decade: 4 million containers were shipped in and out of Australian ports in 2001 compared to 13 million containers in 2021, and it is ports and their services that have to respond to these significant changes.

Throughout this exponential growth and rapid changes, Smartship Australia has played an important role in assisting ports with their developments and training marine pilots, ship officers and tug masters to safely move ships. With the delivery of tens of thousands training days through our mix of specialist courses and bespoke training we have targeted the honing of the skills and expertise of the modern marine pilot.

Smartship Australia believes that continued successful management of COVID-19, leading to less restrictions on travel, is critical in meeting our customer needs. With the easing of border restrictions, Smartship Australia has welcomed back face-to-face inter-state (February) and international (March) customers. While remote training options remain an important component of our service delivery, for some specific training and port development, face-to-face training is often more preferable.

The last six months has also highlighted the value of Smartship Australia's Ship Handling and Bridge Team

Management (BTM) course. This course has recently been redesigned and updated to provide pilots and mariners with an intensive program targeted at developing individual ship handling skills as well as team player skills. Like many of Smartship's courses, this is deliberately a small cohort course, thus ensuring high levels of instructor contact and hands on simulation time. Small cohorts often enable the course to be contextualised to match customer needs (e.g., own port scenarios).

Our Check pilot course is a unique offering in the Australasian market and remains a key service demanded by our customers. Feedback from participants remains resoundingly positive and we have several inter-state and international customers seeking to progress this training for their pilots once they are comfortable with travelling to Smartship. A number of regulators are also interested in how the course fits with their safety regulation oversight.

The launch of the blended ECDIS course has also been very positively received by customers. The mix of on-line theory (2 days remote) and face-to-face practicals (3 days in-house) is working well, as it focuses the training time and reduces potential impact on pilotage rosters. Additionally, the ECDIS course has been upgraded to include an operational PPU module, specifically for pilots. As such, course demand has increased and Smartship will be delivering additional courses to meet this demand over the next few months.



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
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News from Port Ash – March 2022

Borders have nervously opened with courses booked in hope then deferred with renewed plague frights. We have seen a few local pilots this year and RAN courses continue as designated essential training. Our first RNZN visitors arrived last week and Otago are booked to come here in April with Napier later in the year; we look forward to seeing them.

As you can see from our online calendar, the year is already heavily booked and several ports are hinting they want to resume the 3-day Refresher, Contingency & Emergency courses which were becoming so popular just before the plague struck.

Our year started with a couple of courses for new aspiring pilots, warship bridge teams learning the ropes and more recently an Emergency and Contingency course for incumbent Sydney pilots. It had to be deferred partly because of road flood conditions in Sydney, and partly because of forecasted rain of flood proportions here. One forecast had us seriously worried until we saw the (Rain forecast 1.4 – 4.2m) second m!!

The course was deferred to the following week and ran successfully in overcast but dry weather which turned sour again at the end of March.

The lake is in good condition and the weed-growing season is receding. We were in the middle of a weed-dredging maintenance program when the plague interrupted us again last year, but it's only in deep areas and corners and we should resume dredging around or after Easter.

It has been a very warm humid summer culminating in rain and floods throughout NSW as the La Nina extends into autumn. There was recent heavy flooding in Sydney and very severe floods nearer the Queensland border at Lismore which we learn was originally a timber export port built on the river. Brisbane was also severely affected, the

port stopped for a few days and doubtless it was - and still is - a challenging experience for the new pilot team!

Fortunately the heavy rain and flooding did not eventuate in this area, but a few short sharp showers on an already sodden landscape gives a hint as to what is possible if they continue for any length of time. The last course in March ran in flat calm perfect conditions with occasional brief showers of firehose intensity!

The extended wet and a full lake makes me grateful for retirement. Ship handling in Newcastle's Hunter River could be excessively interesting in flood conditions as the fresh flood water runs out in a layer over the incoming flooding tide of denser salt water.

It was under such conditions nearly fifty years ago that I piloted a loaded Russian ship from the Basin around the corner northbound using full helm and engine plus tugs, but in the floodwater ebb area she just would not turn and on emergency full astern, the ship then cut bow to port – the wrong way! We hit a BHP ship alongside on the outside of the turn with cosmetic damage to both ships.

Fifty-odd years later it still puzzles and the only real answer is that the job shouldn't have been done in the first place. After a grilling by the Harbour Master, I was back on the job the following day for which I am eternally grateful. In more recent times, pilots are automatically suspended pending lengthy enquiries which must be horrible for them and damage their confidence. I'm not sure what it achieves - the vibe used to be to get back on your horse and be a better pilot for it; which I was!

Every river port has the same conditions from time to time and current is an interesting study. At one stage a Newcastle study was carried out using current detectors at different depths and at one spot, the normal tidal currents were boxing the compass at different depths which brought the study to a halt and left us to just get on with the job using feel and experience.

On the domestic scene we had a change of team at Christmas as Martin retired from the boatshed due to ill health; his replacement Peter joined us in January. Brett, our Office Manager and Accountant retired but is now





contracted and working from home. Peter is his son, so it is still in the family! Otherwise the team is still together and Shelly continues to provide the wonderful lunches. We recently welcomed newly-retired Sydney pilot Neil Farmer to our facilitator team – you may recall him as an ex-editor of Safe Passage some years ago.

Machining of the working parts of the new Supply model's CPP progresses slowly and it has turned out to be a longer and more intricate job than anticipated. So far as we know, only two of the other centres have a CPP-fitted ship and now we know why! It may be a couple of months before we run trials.

Recently we saw pictures and film of LHD HMAS Adelaide (230m) alongside in Tonga with relief supplies following the January eruption. We have an 11.5m ship-model of her which is extensively used by Navy and we wondered how much the training here helped. She was berthed without tugs and the Navigator commented how useful his recent visit here had been when berthing with strong wind and tidal conditions.

The LHD ships have twin azimuthing pods and thrusters based on cruise ship design. Cruise ship training is carried out mostly on simulators and so far as I'm aware, only Port Revel and Port Ash have large manned azi-models which are large enough to allow a degree of bridge team training as well as the ship handling aspect.


Hats off to CMA CGM for their policy https://gcaptain.com/cma-cgm-to-stop-carrying-plastic-waste-on-its-ships/?subscriber=true&goal=0_f50174ef03-5e929c92 Cynically perhaps I suspect it is a commercial decision and in some way driven by the world container shortage, but perhaps not. Suffice it to say that all our waste here is sorted and is hopefully recycled within our own national borders!

Wishing you smooth seas, safe ladders, a good lee, virus-free ships and safe piloting from us all at Port Ash.



Cliff Beazley & the Team
Port Ash – October 2021

Autonomous shipping and the future of pilotage training showcase depth of expertise in AMC Search at 2022 AMPI Conference.



AMC Search, the training and consultancy division of the Australian Maritime College (AMC), participated in the 2022 AMPI Conference in Wollongong, where staff delivered a series of papers and hosted a trade display to help facilitate close engagement with the marine pilot sector.

A core reason for AMCS' existence, is to ensure that the deep of expertise and R&D developed at AMC, can be leveraged to enhance training outcomes for the industry, including marine pilots, which was the focus of our attendance at this year's AMPI conference.

Manager of Commercial Simulations, Captain Richard Dunham, presented a paper titled *"Is Current Seafarer Training assisting Pilotage Organisations?"*.

Captain Dunham' paper questioned if there is a need, from a Pilotage Organisation perspective, to amend STCW to include the additional skills required for a novice pilot?

In broad outline, the list of skills required might include Ship Handling, use of tugs, use of radar, use of GNSS, radio communication, Bridge Resource Management skills, and responding to emergencies.

These separate skills are covered by STCW, but are these competencies sufficient as a start point for training as a pilot?

Captain Dunham highlighted work undertaken by the Nautical Institute that he says reveals skill gaps between STCW competencies, and the skillset required by a new master.

Since the traditional route into pilotage required experience as master, the existence of the NI course indicates that the STCW requirements fall short of providing the recruit pilot with the necessary underlying skillset.

For example, a new pilot recruit would have plenty of experience as a watchkeeper in the use of radar, as is required by STCW, but this will generally be limited to a small number of different radar types, where the information is presented in English.

Therefore, what happens when a pilot is confronted with radar where the menus and control identification is annotated in Japanese, or Cyrillic script?

Can the recruit recognise the source of information by the "look" of the screen?

This can be taught but is not a requirement within STCW.

Similarly, a recruit is unlikely to have expertise or exposure to the advanced equipment in use by many pilot authorities, such as the use Real-time Kinematic positioning (RTK).

Thus, a steep initial learning curve will be required by that recruit that may rely on "trickle-down" training provided by their peers.

Captain Dunham suggested that a short-term solution could be a bridging course of some type to bridge the gap between seafarer qualifications and the skills required by the recruit pilot.

However, with a review of STCW due at IMO, probably next year, the time is ripe to start lobbying the IMO Sub-Committee attendees to include competencies more suited to pilot recruits in the review.

In another presentation, Nick Bonser, AMCS Autonomous Maritime Systems Instructor presented a paper titled *"Education for Autonomous Vessels"*.

Mr. Bonser said that autonomous and remotely operated vessels are no longer a thing of the future, they are our present, but what do we know about them and how will it affect seafarers and our ports?

In terms of ports and local waterways, small autonomous vessels are being used to conduct bathymetric surveys and shortly, Autonomous Underwater Vehicles, will be used for in-water hull surveys and bio security inspections.

There is also the need to consider recreational users, and this could require introducing established operating areas, exclusion zones or a total ban on such vessels being operated in ports.

Internationally, autonomous shipping is accelerating, such as remotely operated tugs, autonomous ferry trials and Elon Musk's autonomous barge.

To help the sector understand these issues and the impacts on the sector, the Nautical Institute has established the Autonomous Technology Advisory Group (ATAG).

ATAG will keep abreast of developments in the field, unpack likely impacts on the sector and provide guidance and educational materials on managing those impacts, including on how it will impact people and career opportunities.

Mr. Bonser argues people will have a role, but the jobs will be different because “autonomous” doesn’t mean “unmanned”, and seafarer jobs are unlikely to disappear anytime soon.

Similarly, Dr G. Reza Emad and AMC PhD. Candidate Mehrangiz Shahbakhsh presented a paper with a focus on training called “Australia’s Future of Maritime 4.0: The case of human element challenges and training needs”.

This paper provided delegates with detailed insight into their work that is examining the potential impacts on the maritime workforce through Maritime 4.0 and the introduction of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships.

From work recently published in the *Asian Journal of Shipping and Logistics*, they suggested that the Australian maritime industry can invest in the current workforce by applying a new training continuum that includes lifelong learning policies to upskill and reskill prospective and existing ship and port operators and marine pilots.

During the talk, they showcased their work on Industry 5.0 and for the first time introduced two new concepts of Pilot 4.0 (ePilot) and Pilot 5.0 as the possible role of pilots in the coming 5.0 industrial revolution.

AMCS thanks AMPI for another well organised professional conference that provided delegates with an opportunity to engage on pressing topics facing the sector and looks forward to participating at the next event.



Courtesy of Captain Shaun Boot - Bow to Bow in Port Hedland

Southern Ports


has successfully achieved accreditation with ISPO

Considered best practice for pilots and pilot organisations, this award covers their operations in deep sea pilotage; harbour and docking pilotage; general sea, river and harbour pilotage, pilot cutter logistics transport; and line men berthing support.

Southern Ports joins leading Australian pilotage providers Port Hedland Pilots and a host of international ports in gaining this accreditation, which is exceptional recognition for their Harbour Masters and pilot teams.



*Courtesy of Captain Jim Grinter
- Dolphins on the Bulbous Bow*



MR Tanker

Diligent Pilotage: Lessons Learned from the Jolly Nero

Paperback – 29 March 2022 • by Antonio Di Lieto (Author)

On 7 May 2013 at 22:59 the cargo ship Jolly Nero, following a failure of its main engine, hit the Pilots' Tower of the port of Genoa at a speed of about 3 knots, causing it to collapse.

The accident cost the lives of nine people and resulted in the criminal conviction of the Jolly Nero's Captain, Chief Engineer and First Officer.

It is one of those rare events that, because of its catastrophic consequences, lay bare the operations of the entire sociotechnical system in which it occurs, creating a window of opportunity for improving safety.


This book is written in the hope that the lessons learned from the Jolly Nero will lead pilotage organisations, shipping companies and port authorities to exercise due diligence with the aim of preventing accidents and withstanding the increasing level of scrutiny of courts of law.

The tragic loss of lives in the rubble of the Genoa Pilots' Tower will have been in vain if what happened on that evening does not result in improvements to safety of navigation in confined waters.

We all have a duty and need to learn from the Jolly Nero accident, and work towards a diligent pilotage.

"It consolidates developments over the last 40 years and incorporates contributions of mariners from different parts of the world - a truly international effort. Antonio Di Lieto has done a magnificent job in putting it altogether in just 152 pages. It should also be considered a companion volume to his other book - BRIDGE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT From the Costa Concordia to Navigation in the Digital Age." Ravi Nijjer

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PAN PEER ASSISTANCE NETWORK



Caring for Marine Pilots and their Families

WHAT IS PAN

AMPI established and continues to finance a Peer Assistance Network to give support to Marine Pilots and their families.

PAN Members are Marine Pilots who come from a variety of ports around Australia we are trained and committed to supporting the well-being of our peers.

WHAT CAN I CONTACT PAN ABOUT?

Any issue at work or home that may be causing you difficulty. Common issues we see are relationships, problems at work, training and/or assessment problems, health, stress, fatigue and financial issues.

If you have ANY issue causing you concern you can talk to a PAN Member.

SUPPORT NETWORK

PAN is designed to provide support over the phone. Initial contact can be made to a Marine Pilot peer who is on our list of trained PAN Members.

PAN Members are trained to listen and offer support in a non-judgemental way, AMPI also has retained the services of a professional counsellor who you may also wish to contact.

PAN IS CONFIDENTIAL

All PAN members sign a deed of confidentiality and they know that this is the main principle that ensures PAN continues to work effectively.

The PAN network provides an independent confidential place for you to freely discuss your problems.



PAN MEMBERS

Kirk Whitman
Sydney - 0410 475 006

Neil McKenzie
Sydney - 0437 704 571

Lyndon Clark
Sydney - 0404 042 591

Jacqui Kenyon
Sydney - 0405 443 483

Jon Dicker
Melbourne - 0427 378 911

Bruce McMinn
Melbourne - 0408 558 486

Doug Dow
Adelaide - 0417 834 910

John Ball
Fremantle - 0418 939 236

Rory Main
Fremantle - 0437 870 007

Julian Thomas
Fremantle - 0418 949 817

Shannon Nicholson
Mid-West Ports - 0409 171 482

Ross Halsall
Mid-West Ports - 0478 011 372

Adam McPhail
Cape Cuvier - 0407 089 967

Peter Dann
Woodside - 0448 842 218

Glenn Attril
Woodside - 0407 948 735

Elliot Bibby
Woodside - 0459 979 758

Craig Eastaugh
Port Hedland - 0438 500 570

Matt Shirley
Port Hedland - 0427 197 272

Mick Wall
Port Hedland - 0400 085 988

David Murgatroyd
MSWA - 0437 288 300

Ben Ranson
Mackay - 0438 121 584

Peter Liley
Brisbane - 0407 655 926

Chris Kline
Brisbane - 0409 548 412

Geoff Dawson
Brisbane - 0418 714 058

Sean Liley
Brisbane - 0408 558 486

Scott Clinton
Newcastle - 0419 808 668

PROFESSIONAL COUNSELLOR

Marcus Romanic
0419 382 352
mromanic@bigpond.com

EXTERNAL SERVICES WHICH MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE

Beyond Blue - beyondblue.org.au
Black Dog Institute - blackdoginstitute.org.au



Photo: Tauri Minogue Photography

Farewell **AMPI** – March 2022

Dear Marvie,

I am writing to inform you that I will not be renewing my membership to AMPI as I have retired from pilotage at Christmas Island.

I would like to thank you, the committee, and members for welcoming me in when I came over from the UK in 2014.

Traditionally, Christmas Island pilots were recruited from the UK and the port ran in splendid isolation. I was probably the first who was an experienced pilot from a large port and this isolation hit me in so far as how behind the port was with training, safety culture and procedure. There was no PPE, not even lifejackets, no RA, no PP, no MPX or even a structured training programme. I knew that this had to change but I had to tread carefully, I didn't want to come in as the pom who upset the whole island!


Luckily the Stevedore company got a new manager shortly after I arrived, and he felt the same way so between us over the next year or so we brought the port up to date. Part of that for my side was joining AMPI and becoming part of the Australian Pilotage family and although Christmas Island is remote, and we have not been able to travel to meet face to face I have found membership to be beneficial. I have encouraged successive pilots to join and hope that this will continue.

It is at major crossroads in life that you look back and survey how you got to this point and for me it started back in 1976 as a Deck Cadet for BP Tankers. I had the privilege to be on the flagship, ss British Respect for the Spithead Naval Review in 1977 to celebrate the Queen's Silver Jubilee and it is amazing to think that 45 years later we are now getting ready for a 70-year celebration of the Queen's reign.

In 1983 I was seconded to the new Emergency Support Vessel, ESV Iolair as DPO in the North Sea which opened my eyes to a seagoing life away from tankers. Consequently, when the time came to return to the tanker fleet, I instead joined Townsend Car Ferries to ply the short sea route between Dover and Calais, Boulogne and Zeebrugge. This was a great move for me and my young family as I lived and had grown up just a few miles from Dover.

Having come from the highly regulated Oil and Gas industry the ethos of the busy ferry company was much different, if the ships ran full and on time there was little input from the company and a certain laxness was evident which came to a head on 6th March 1987 with the terrible disaster that was the Herald of Free Enterprise. It was a terrible time, but lessons were learned, and the industry almost overcompensated to get back passenger trust and re-build reputation and confidence.

I probably would have stayed at P & O Ferries (as Townsend became) had it not been dead man's shoes for promotion as I really enjoyed the fast pace of working. I decided to go into Pilotage and got a trainee pilot position at River Medway in Kent in 1997.



A kindly Captain sheltering me from the Sun!

The river Medway is a spur off the Thames estuary and has a district spanning up to 66 nautical miles, over 20 berths and handles vessels from Q Max LNG tankers to small 50m coasters. It was a wonderful district and a great job involving a lot of variety and ship-handling experiences.

With Russia in the news now for all the wrong reasons, in the late 1990's their old ships were allowed out and coming across the North Sea with timber. The crew were watched closely by the Commissar, generally only one person spoke any English and they always proudly opened a new jar of Nescafe for you. Not so pleasant were the little open sandwiches of stale bread and cheese usually with a thumb print on the cheese where they had held it down to cut into a circle!

After a few years I joined the pilot management committee and eventually became chairman for what would turn out to be a tumultuous time for the port which had just been absorbed into the Peel Ports Group.

From around 2010 we were in protracted negotiations to save pilot jobs and earnings and had the unpleasant task of fighting compulsory redundancies. It is horrible to be part of a process that selects your colleagues to be "let go" especially when you know that recruitment will be needed in a short time when the older pilots start to retire.



With Captain Craig (right) on Company vessel in early days of Covid.

I found this era very disheartening and in 2013 saw an advert for a Marine Pilot in a corner of paradise called Christmas Island. I applied thinking I had nothing to lose but after the initial interview in London knew that this was my next move and I managed to get a second interview on the island early in 2014.

Funnily enough after the first day on the island both my wife and I disliked it and I was going to turn the job down if I was offered it but on day two, I went afloat, and my wife had a tour of the island. By the end of the day, we had done a 180 as they say, and I was happy to accept the job offer that followed.

After authorization the other pilot, who was approaching 70 returned to the UK and took up the relief pilot role leaving me as sole pilot most of the time. This continued until a combination of the 457 Visa withdrawal and the relief pilot wanting to retire.

In 2018 I recruited and trained Captain Craig Seeley and took to the relief pilot role whilst at the same time looking for a vessel for our parent company to purchase. We took over mv Red Titan in December 2019 which coincided with Craig giving me notice that he had accepted a position with Brisbane Marine Pilots, so it was back to the island as full-time pilot and to train the next incumbent, Captain Luke Mioceovich from Perth.


Unfortunately, COVID has precluded me from returning to the relief pilot role as travel in and out of Australia (WA in particular), made it impossible to carry out the role unless I resided full time in Perth. We are now in the process of training a second pilot from Perth so that there will always be cover at short notice.



L to R: Captain Luke, Sue Fawke (Agency Admin), Captain Mike at Christmas Island.

In the meantime, I will be kept busy managing our ship and looking for another one to purchase and manage as Christmas Island continues to eke the last reserves of Phosphate from its leases which currently expire in 2034. Our vessels will also continue to build on their supply role for containers, vehicles, and equipment to the island from Port Klang, Malaysia, mainland Australia and at times from around the globe.

Kind regards
Captain Mike Fawke



Pilot boat approaching

AMPI EXECUTIVE

NAME	POSITION	TIME ZONE(S)	EMAIL	MOBILE
Peter Dann	President	Dampier & Gold Coast	president@ampi.org.au	0448 842 218
Bernardo Obando	Treasurer/Vice President	Darwin	treasurer@ampi.org.au	0419 500 927
Marvie Rouse	Admin & Secretary	Newcastle	admin@ampi.org.au	0458 014 660
Josephine Clark	Vice President	Port Kembla	vp@ampi.org.au	0406 065 317
Jeremy Brew	Director	Newcastle	jeremybrew@me.com	0467 791 810
Marcus Barrett	Director	Gladstone	marcusbarrett72@gmail.com	0416 370 432
Andrew, Shaun & Daniel	Web Admin	Gladstone, Port Hedland	web@ampi.org.au	As Above
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Toby Shelton	Director	Melbourne	tshelton@ppsp.com.au	0427 549 923

Snapshots



Please submit your photos to editor@ampi.org.au

Captain Marco Blanco, en-route to a ship in Port Hedland



Strong covid protocols are still in place onboard ships

Why I am a member of **AMPI**

Like any professional organisation, AMPI requires a sound membership base and volunteers to operate effectively, basically AMPI is only as good as its membership.

While members are entitled to expect us to advocate the professional interests of pilots, AMPI relies on its members to give us direction. The Executive recognises that strong membership is the key to the success of AMPI, and will enable us to continue to be a respected voice in the Maritime industry.



We are often asked by pilots “what do I get for my AMPI membership” so below is a summary of ‘the value of an AMPI membership’

- As an AMPI member you are part of an association that has the professional interests of marine pilots as its number one priority, working with other industry stakeholders, domestically and internationally, to ensure high standards are maintained in our profession.
- As a member of AMPI you automatically become a member of IMPA. AMPI has strong representation at IMPA which can lead to changes industry wide.
- An AMPI executive member is currently representing IMPA at the ISO committee, revising ISO 799:2004 Pilot Ladder standards.
- All AMPI members currently benefit from the recently revised IMO standards for rigging pilot ladders which was influenced largely by submissions from AMPI.
- AMPI has a good relationship with AMSA with mutual support with many endeavours to improve marine pilot safety.
- As the nationally recognised professional body, AMPI is able to develop best practice policies, set national standards, and influence international standards, on relevant aspects of pilotage. For example, PPU operations, pilot ladder hull magnets, helicopter hatch access, pilot boat design, competition in pilotage, pilot training (initial and ongoing), simulator use, PPE requirements, etc
- With its vast pool of maritime knowledge and experience, AMPI, with members input, has the ability to provide expert advice to industry on all pilotage related matters and many port operations and design issues.
- AMPI has developed an online Continuous Professional Development (CPD) program, that was recently launched in Queensland, and available to any pilotage jurisdiction that wish to participate. This program was developed to enable all pilots to be able to maintain minimum standards in all aspects of training that are relevant to pilotage.
- AMPI is host to the Pilot Training Advisory Board. This board is represented by many industry organisations and considers current and future issues relevant to pilot recruitment and training.
- AMPI has a peer support program available to all pilots. This program is supported by psychologists that understand our industry and are independent of any employers. A number of pilots from around Australia have undergone Peer Support training to enable them to further assist pilots at a local level.
- AMPI conduct two workshops every year at various ports around the country that are organised by local AMPI members. These workshops are reasonably priced thanks to industry sponsorship. At these two day events industry stakeholders and pilots hear from a variety of speakers that are experts in their field, enabling participants to keep up with industry trends and network with stakeholders.
- AMPI has also hosted two major international Pilotage and Port Logistics Conferences and one IMPA Congress. These major events have attracted stakeholders and decision makers at the highest international level and are an opportunity maintain the high profile of our profession while listening to the challenges of other stakeholders.
- AMPI members are entitled to discounts for registration at our workshops and conferences.
- The AMPI website www.ampi.org is becoming a valuable tool for members to stay connected with the Institute and have their say on any issues that concern them. The website is still being developed but currently contains:
 - Information on workshops and conferences
 - Papers from workshops and conferences
 - Incident reports
 - AMPI position papers
 - Access to the CPD program
 - Chat forum (Voice)
 - IMPA notices
 - Memberships forms
 - AMPI has a social media presence, members can stay connected with the AMPI Facebook page.
 - Safe Passage is AMPI’s quarterly magazine which includes news, views and articles on pilotage, shipping and port related topics, member input is most welcome.
 - AMPI membership, as a professional organisation, may be tax deductible.
 - An AMPI membership enables pilots to feel connected with a group of likeminded professionals and perhaps stay in touch with old shipmates and meet new ones.
 - As an AMPI member you are represented by an enthusiastic executive who commit considerable time and energy to the profession. We need your support enable us to maintain the momentum.



MARITIME TRAINING

ON THE DOORSTEP OF THE GREAT BARRIER REEF

The Great Barrier Reef International Marine College (GBRIMC), in partnership with TAFE Queensland, is at the forefront to deliver maritime training in accordance with regulatory requirements and the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA).

Located in Cairns – North Queensland, our modern training facility offers a comprehensive range of training qualifications and certificates.

Training complies with the requirements of the International Maritime Organisation Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (IMO STCW).

Staff at GBRIMC have extensive industry experience, hold current maritime qualifications and are experts in their field.

We are flexible in our approach to training, and aim to schedule course delivery in line with client's operational requirements.

FACILITIES

Clients have access to a Full Mission Bridge simulator (Kongsberg) with pre-programmed digital port models. Our tug-optimised bridge offers highly flexible navigational operations with a 360 degree field of vision.

The tug-optimised bridge can work in conjunction with or separate to the Full Mission Bridge simulator as well as eight Kongsberg desktop simulators for full electronic navigations.



TRAINING

- > **Coastal Pilots Continued Professional Development**
As per M054 section 61(1)(c)***
- > **ECDIS – Use an electronic chart display and information system to navigate safely** MARH023
STCW Reg II/1 & II/2
- > **Transmit and receive information by the global maritime distress and safety system** MAR0011
Marine Emergency Care, Craft and Communication (GMDSS) STCW Reg IV/2
- > **Global Maritime Distress Safety System (GMDSS) Revalidation****
Relevant competencies from STCW Table A-IV/2
- > **Train the Simulator Trainer and Assessor*****
STCW Reg I/6, STCW A-I/6, STCW Reg I/12, STCW A-I/1 VI/5
- > **Tug and Barge Master General Operators Course****

** Non-accredited training
*** AMSA Approved

 **gbrimc.com.au**
 **1300 308 233** (extension 5)

 Great Barrier Reef
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